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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 920466-CA 
v. I 
Priority No. 2 
LONNIE KIRKLAND MASCIANTONIO, : 
Defendant/Appellant.: 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a judgment and sentence entered 
upon a no contest plea to the charge of forgery, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1990). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion to 
quash the information based on its interpretation of Utah Code 
Ann. S 76-6-501 (1990). This Court reviews a trial court's 
statutory determination for correctness, according it no 
particular deference. State v. Sinah, 819 P.2d 356, 359 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 832 P.2d 476 (Utah 1992); State v. Jaimez, 
817 P.2d 822, 826 (Utah App. 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-501 (1990): 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose 
to defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he is 
facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) Alters any writing of another 
without his authority or utters any such 
altered writing; or 
(b) Hakes, completes, executes, 
authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, 
or utters any writing so that the writing or 
the making, completion, execution, 
authentication, issuance, transference, 
publication or utterance purports to be the 
act of another, whether the person is 
existent or nonexistent, or purports to have 
been executed at a time or place or in a 
numbered sequence other than was in fact the 
case, or to be a copy of an original when no 
such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section "writing" includes 
printing or any other method of recording information, 
checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, 
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, 
right, privilege, or identification• 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if 
the writing is or purports to be: 
(a) A security, revenue stamp, or any 
other instrument or writing issued by a 
government, or any agency thereof; or 
(b) A check with a face amount of $100 
or more, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any 
other instrument or writing representing an 
interest in or claim against property, or a 
pecuniary interest in or claim against any 
person or enterprise. 
(4) Forgery is a felony of the third degree if 
the writing is or purports to be a check with a face 
amount of less than $100; all other forgery is a class 
A misdemeanor• 
The text of any other relevant constitutional, 
statutory, or rule provisions pertinent to the resolution of the 
issue presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Lonnie Kirkland Masciantonio, was charged 
with forgery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann, § 76-6-501 (1990) (R. I).1 During the preliminary hearing, 
defendant presented a verbal motion to quash the information 
supported by a written memorandum, urging that the charged 
offense constituted a class A misdemeanor, not a second degree 
felony (R. 30). The court denied the motion, specifically 
finding that the offense was properly charged as a second degree 
felony because the written instrument represented Ma pecuniary 
interest in or claim against any person or enterprise" pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1990) (R. 20; Addendum A attached 
hereto). The court then bound the matter over to the district 
court (R. 30, 33-34). 
Defendant renewed her motion to quash in the district 
court, filing a formal motion supported by two written memoranda 
(R. 35, 36-37, 38-41, 42-51).2 The district judge took judicial 
notice of the evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing, over 
which he had presided (R. 53, 64; Arraignment Transcript 
[hereinafter Arr.] at 5), and explained his "clear recollection 
1
 Defendant was married during the proceedings below, and the 
record was amended by interlineation to reflect her new name of 
Lonnie Kirkland Nielson (R. 20, 66). 
2
 In the district court, defendant sought to have the 
information quashed absent the prosecutor's willingness to amend it 
to reflect a class A misdemeanor (R. 36). For consistency, this 
brief reflects the "motion to quash" terminology used below, 
although the State recognizes that the motion is more properly 
characterized as a motion to dismiss. 
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of the testimony offered by the State of Utah at the preliminary 
hearing" (Arr. at 5; Addendum B attached hereto)* He then denied 
the motion, reiterating that the forged document represented Ma 
pecuniary interest in or claim against the enterprisfe in] 
question here, which happened to be the St. George Radio Shack" 
(R. 53; Arr. 5-6). 
Defendant thereafter entered a no contest plea 
conditioned on her right to appeal the district court's ruling on 
her motion in accordance with State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah 
App. 1988), and North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 
160 (1970) (R. 53, 54-60, 68; Arr. 17-18). The court accepted 
the plea (Arr. 18), stayed imposition of the sentence, and placed 
defendant on probation for 36 months (R. 66-67, 69-71). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Between June 1990 and April 1991, defendant was 
employed as assistant manager at Radio Shack in St. George, Utah 
(Preliminary Hearing Transcript [hereinafter Prelim.] at 3-4). 
On April 4, 1991, Radio Shack's owner, Al Coif, discovered an 
invoice which reflected that defendant had put some speakers on 
layaway and had made a partial payment of $70.22 to the store's 
manager on April 2, 1991 (Prelim, at 13, 25-27; see Addendum C 
for copies of all relevant invoices). A second invoice reflected 
a second payment of $202.00, representing the balance owed on the 
speakers, allegedly made to the same manager on April 6, 1991, at 
6:28 p.m. (Prelim, at 13-14, 27-28; Addendum C). Coif also 
discovered a third invoice which had been written seven minutes 
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before the second invoice (Prelim, at 10, 12, 14), and which 
appeared to reflect the signature of a customer, Leslie Church. 
It reflected that Church had returned to the same store manager 
two pieces of merchandise and had received a cash refund of 
$227.79 (Prelim, at 10, 12, 14, 17; Addendum C). The manager in 
question was not working during any of the times indicated on the 
three invoices (Prelim, at 9-10, 15, 28-29, 30), and he denied 
receiving either of defendant's two payments or handling the 
Church transaction (Prelim, at 27). Defendant was working during 
the periods reflected on all the invoices (Prelim, at 10, 15). 
None of the invoices had been processed pursuant to standard 
company policy (Prelim, at 7-8), an original sales slip could not 
be found (Prelim, at 20), and the returned merchandise was 
missing (Prelim, at 8, 9, 17, 25). The store contacted Leslie 
Church who denied returning any merchandise to the store (Prelim, 
at 12, 31-32). The State charged defendant with forgery of the 
Church receipt, contending that she forged and submitted the 
receipt to Radio Shack to conceal her theft of cash or 
merchandise from the company (R. 62)• 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court properly found that the forged 
invoice represented Ma pecuniary interest in or claim against" 
Radio Shack, thereby establishing the gradation of the offense. 
The language of § 76-6-501 is clear and unambiguous on its face 
and plainly proscribes defendant's conduct as a second degree 
felony. Consequently, the doctrine of eiusdem generis does not 
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apply, and the statute should be interpreted pursuant to its 
plain language without the need to look at its legislative 
history. 
The Shondel doctrine does not apply because § 76-6-501 
is clear and unambiguous in its application to defendant's 
offense. Further, the statute does not impose different 
penalties for identical conduct- Hence, defendant is not 
entitled to the lesser grade of offense. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-
501(3)(B) (1990) IS APPLICABLE TO DEFENDANT'S 
CONDUCT 
In denying defendant's motion to quash, the district 
court held that the offense constituted a second degree felony 
because the invoice was an "instrument or writing representing 
. . a pecuniary interest in or claim against any person or 
enterprise" as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(3)(b) 
(1990) (R. 53; Arr. 5-6; Addenda A & B). Defendant argues that 
the phrasing of subsection (3)(b) necessarily limits the "other 
instrument or writing" to those documents of similar character as 
issues of corporate stock certificates or bonds (Br. of App. at 
5). She contends that because the writing at issue is not of 
this character, she was entitled to have the charge against her 
reduced to a class A misdemeanor. This limited interpretation is 
without merit where the language of the statute is clear on its 
face and was properly applied by the district court. 
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This Court reviews a trial court's statutory 
interpretation for correctness. State v. Singh, 819 P.2d 356, 
359 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 832 P.2d 476 (Utah 1992); State v. 
Jaimez. 817 P.2d 822, 826 (Utah App. 1991). The primary 
responsibility in statutory construction is "to give effect to 
the intent of the legislature." Singh, 819 P.2d at 359 (quoting 
State v. Jones, 735 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah App. 1987)). "Where 
statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we will not look 
further to divine legislative intent, but will construe the 
statute according to its plain language." Singh, 819 P.2d 356, 
358; Jaime2, 817 P.2d at 826; Jones, 735 P.2d at 402. 
Defendant's interpretation is based on her application 
of the doctrine of elusdem generis. That doctrine provides that 
"'where general words follow the enumeration of particular 
classes of things, the general words will be construed as 
applying only to things of the same general class as those 
enumerated.'" State v. Serpente, 768 P.2d 994, 997 (Ut. App. 
1989) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 464 (5th ed. 1979)). The 
doctrine only applies when 
(1) the statute contains an enumeration by 
specific words; (2) the members of the 
enumeration suggest a class; (3) the class is 
not exhausted by the enumeration; (4) a 
general reference supplementing the 
enumeration, usually following it; and (5) 
there is not clearly manifested an intent 
that the general term be given a broader 
meaning than the doctrine requires. It is 
generally held that the rule of elusdem 
generis is merely a rule of construction and 
is only applicable where legislative intent 
or language expressing that intent is 
unclear. 
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NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.18 (5th 
ed. 1992). The Utah Supreme Court has voiced agreement with this 
analysis, holding that the doctrine does not apply absent 
ambiguity. Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co., 793 P.2d 362, 367 
(Utah 1990); Village Inn Apartments, v. State Farm Fire & 
Casualty Co., 790 P.2d 581, 538-84 & n.2 (Utah App. 1990); see, 
e.g., Singh, 819 P.2d at 359. Because there is no ambiguity in 
the statutory language defendant challenges, the doctrine does 
not apply in this case. 
Subsection (3)(b) specifically enumerates 3 types of 
instruments: a check for $100 or more, an issue of stocks, and 
an issue of bonds (see supra at 2 for complete text of statute). 
Defendant's argument ignores the significance of the 
legislature's intentional inclusion of a check and focuses only 
on the stocks and bonds language. However, it is essential to 
consider all of the language to determine the relevant 
legislative intent. As defendant points out, a check is not of 
the same character document as stocks or bonds (Br. of App. at 6-
7). See People v. Korsen, 459 N.Y.S. 2d 380, 381-82 (1983) (bank 
checks are not to be included within a listing of "corporate 
stock certificates, bonds and the likeM). However, all three 
instruments contain a common element which is identified in the 
remainder of the subsection: they all represent "an interest in 
or claim against property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim 
against any person or enterprise." Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-
501(3)(b); see State v. Allegra, 129 N.H. 720, 533 A.2d 338, 341-
8 
42 (N.H. 1987) (attributing the common characteristic noted in 
the statute to all three of the specifically listed documents). 
The statute then includes, without an exhaustive listing, all 
other instruments which possess the same common element. The 
language clearly indicates that the "other instruments" need only 
possess the single common characteristic. See Alleara, 533 A.2d 
at 342 (finding that a document does not fall within the 
described grade of offense where it is not one of the three 
documents specifically listed and does not represent the interest 
or claim identified in the statute and common in the listed 
documents). 
As the district court found, the writing at issue in 
this case meets this requirement. In the normal course of 
business, a customer's signature on a properly drafted invoice 
for returned merchandise represents a claim against Radio Shack 
for the purchase price of the merchandise which has been 
returned. When the signed invoice is returned to the store 
employee, the purchase price is given to the customer in 
satisfaction of the claim or, if store funds are insufficient, 
the customer is sent to another location where, upon 
presentation, the invoice is paid (Prelim, at 6, 22-23). 
Consequently, an invoice for the return of merchandise 
represents, however briefly, the customer's pecuniary claim 
against the business. The forged invoice in this instance 
purports to represent such an interest and, hence, comes within 
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the type of instrument whose forgery is intended by the statute 
to be punished as a second degree felony. 
Defendant contends that the invoice is not the type of 
instrument required by subsection (3)(b) because, unlike stocks 
and bonds, it was not and could not have been used or negotiated 
against Radio Shack, apparently because no money was actually 
paid by Radio Shack in exchange for the invoice (Br. of App. at 
7). This argument fails for two reasons. First, the requirement 
of negotiability stems from defendant's contention that the 
instrument must be "similar to issues of corporate stock 
certificates or bonds" (Br. of App. at 5), which argument ignores 
the plain language of the statute as discussed above. The 
statute does not require that the forged writing be negotiable; 
merely that it be a "symbol[] of value, right, privilege, or 
identification." Utah Code Ann- § 76-6-501(2); c£. Singh, 819 
P.2d at 359 (nothing in the statute "suggests that the 
legislature intended that an instrument be legally effective or 
complete"). Second, the instrument need not actually represent 
the interest identified in subsection (3)(b). It is sufficient 
if the writing "purports to be" an instrument representing the 
identified interests. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(3). The invoice 
in this case not only purports to represent a claim by Church 
against Radio Shack for a refund of $227.79, but purports to 
represent Radio Shack's payment of the claim as evidenced by the 
company's refund policy and the presence of the invoice in the 
company's records. Even assuming, as defendant claims, that it 
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factually represents only "an effort to conceal a theft through 
fabrication of a writing" (Br. of App. at 7), the district court 
could properly focus on what the invoice, on its face, purports 
to represent. 
Defendant further distinguishes the invoice from the 
enumeration in subsection (3)(b) as representing the 
extinguishment of a claim (Br. of App. at 7). This argument 
appears to require that the forged instrument represent an 
outstanding interest or claim before it may give rise to a second 
degree felony charge. This argument is untenable as it would 
undermine the legislature's intent to punish forgeries of equal 
magnitude as second degree felonies. The statute's language 
reflects the legislature's exercise of its prerogative to define 
the elements and degree of punishment for the crime of forgery. 
See State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 504-05 (Utah 1989). 
Defendant's argument would require that any forged writing 
constituting a second degree offense which was negotiated or 
otherwise paid prior to prosecution would be punished as a class 
A misdemeanor. This is clearly contrary to both the statutory 
language and any realistic interpretation of the legislative 
intent behind the statute. 
"Forgery is a crime aimed primarily at safeguarding 
confidence in the genuiness of documents relied upon in 
commercial and business activity." WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. 
SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW S 8.7(5) (1986). The forged 
document fits within this primary concern as it was routinely 
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relied upon by the victim business in conducting its daily 
business activity. The form used to facilitate the forgery was 
the standard invoice form used by Radio Shack in all its sale and 
refund transactions. The invoices were used to maintain and 
update customer mailing lists (Prelim, at 11), to maintain 
accurate inventory counts (Prelim, at 21), to review individual 
salesman activity, and for other management purposes (Prelim, at 
19). Although the charged offense represents a single 
transaction of $227.79, the fact that this method of forgery 
could easily be conducted on a larger-scale is demonstrated both 
by the owner's concern for several invoices representing returns 
for which refunds had been given but no corresponding returned 
merchandise could be found (Prelim, at 8, 16, 30) and by the fact 
that the forgery occurred on a document which was readily 
available in an apparently unlimited supply to all store salesmen 
(Prelim, at 4, 6-7, 11). The number of forged invoices and the 
amount of each is limited only by the forger and the company's 
ability to screen for such forgeries. 
Because the commercial invoice at issue in this case 
purports to represent a claim against and honored by Radio Shack, 
it satisfies the common condition required by the plain language 
of subsection (3)(b), and the offense constitutes a second degree 
forgery. Hence, the trial court properly exercised its 
discretion in denying defendant's motion to quash the 
information. 
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POINT II 
THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT BEHIND § 76-6-501 IS 
CLEAR FROM THE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE 
OF THE STATUTE, OBVIATING THE NEED FOR A 
REVIEW OF THE STATUTE'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
TO INTERPRET ITS PLAIN LANGUAGE 
In an argument closely related to her first point, 
defendant appears to contend that her conduct was not the type of 
large-scale forgery intended to be addressed by § 76-6-501(3), 
and that her small-scale forgery is adequately addressed by the 
theft statute; thus, because the alleged theft would be 
punishable as a class A misdemeanor, the forgery allegedly 
committed to conceal the theft should be punished as the same 
degree of offense (Br. of App. at 10).3 
As previously established, the language of § 76-6-
501(3)(b) is clear and unambiguous on its face. (See Point I.) 
Accordingly, this Court should construe the statute according to 
its plain language and not address the "legislative history" 
argument suggested by defendant. Singh, 819 P.2d at 358; Jaimez, 
817 P.2d at 826; Jones, 735 P.2d at 402. 
Defendant also argues that the State in fact seeks only 
to punish the taking of $227.79 from Radio Shack and that the 
theft statute provides the appropriate punishment for a taking of 
3
 Defendant does not argue that the forgery and theft statutes 
both apply to prohibit the conduct with which she is charged, 
thereby entitling her to application of the theft statute pursuant 
to State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 346, 453 P.2d 146, 148 (1969). 
She simply equates the punishments for theft and forgery and 
contends that, based upon the amount of her forgery, she is 
entitled to the same punishment she would have received for theft 
of an equal value. 
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this amount (Br. of App. at 10, citing to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
412(1)(c) (1990)/ providing that theft of property valued between 
$100 and $250 is a class A misdemeanor). The State charged and 
prosecuted defendant for forgery, not theft (R. 1). The fact 
that defendant may have committed the forgery to conceal the 
theft and may have realized no additional monetary benefit from 
the forgery does not require that she be punished solely on the 
basis of the theft. Further, the amount of the theft cannot be 
determined from the record on appeal/ which contains only part of 
the three-day preliminary hearing below. Although the record 
suggests that defendant may have taken cash or merchandise in 
excess of $227.79/ the amount of the theft is not relevant to her 
prosecution for forgery. The suggestion that the legislature 
intended to correlate theft and forgery is further undermined 
where the forgery statute clearly provides that forgery of a 
check for less than $100 constitutes a third degree felony (Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-501(4))/ while theft of property valued at less 
than $100 constitutes a class B misdemeanor (Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-412(l)(d) (1990). 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY SENTENCED FOR A SECOND 
DEGREE FELONY IN LIGHT OF THE CLEAR AND 
UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF § 76-6-501 
Defendant argues that because Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 
is not clear and specific concerning whether her forgery 
constitutes a second degree felony under subsection (3)(b) or a 
class A misdemeanor under subsection (4), she is entitled to be 
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convicted of and sentenced for the class A misdemeanor pursuant 
to State v, Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 346, 453 P.2d 146, 148 
(1969). Shondel dealt with a situation where possession of LSD 
was punishable by two different statutes, one proscribing the 
conduct as a misdemeanor and the other as a felony. The Utah 
Supreme Court remanded the case for resentencing to the lesser 
penalty. Defendant relies upon the statement in Shondel that 
"where there is doubt or uncertainty as to which of two 
punishments is applicable to an offense an accused is entitled to 
the benefit of the lesser." Shondel, 453 P.2d at 148. 
Subsequent case law from the Utah Supreme Court and this Court 
has clarified the holding in Shondel as providing "that if two 
statutes are wholly duplicative as to the elements of the crime, 
the law does not permit a prosecutor to exercise the wholly 
unfettered authority to decide whether the crime should be 
charged as a misdemeanor or a felony." State v. Brvan, 709 P.2d 
257, 263 (Utah 1985); see also State v. Voqt, 824 P.2d 455, 457 
(Utah App. 1991); State v. Duran, 772 P.2d 982, 987 (Utah App. 
1989) (quoting Brvan, 709 P.2d at 263) ("The application of 
Shondel is limited to situations where the statutes at issue are 
'wholly duplicative as to the elements of the crime. . . . ' " ) . 
As previously discussed, § 76-6-501 is clear and 
unambiguous in its application to defendant's offense. (See 
Point I.) Accordingly, Shondel does not apply, and defendant's 
argument must fail. 
15 
Further, the forgery statute does not impose different 
penalties for identical conduct where, by the express terms of 
the statute, conduct that constitutes a second degree felony 
pursuant to subsection (3) cannot also constitute a class A 
misdemeanor pursuant to subsection (4). Hence, Shondel does not 
entitle defendant to the lesser grade of offense. See State v. 
Stromberq, 783 P.2d 54, 61 (Utah App. 1989). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and 
sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / 3 / a a y of October, 1992, 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to Gary 
W. Pendleton, attorney for appellant, 150 North 200 East, Suite 
202, St. George, Utah 84770, this /S day of October, 1992. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
FiUD 
M
* '" • •• - T COURT 
GARY W.PENDLETON (2564) '92 flfiy 27 Pfl f ?1 
Attorney for Defendant 
150 North 200 East, Suite 202 W 
St. George, Utah 84770 BY 
Ph: 628-4411 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
LONNIE KIRKLAND MASCIANTONIO, ] 
Defendant ] 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
} CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
RE: GRADATION OF OFFENSE 
I Case No. 911001904 
(James L. Shumate) 
The above-entitled matter came on for Preliminary Hearing on January 24,1992, 
at which time the Court heard testimony from Richard L. Wright, questioned document 
examiner. The matter was thereafter continued in order to afford the State opportunity to 
conduct further investigation of the case and examination of other questioned documents. The 
matter came on again for Preliminary Hearing on April 30, 1992, during which hearing 
testimony from Richard L. Wright was concluded and the matter was again continued until on 
May 1,1992. The Court having heard the testimony of the witnesses and having received into 
evidence certain documents, the Court concluded that the Defendant should be bound over for 
O; 0UNTY 
1 
trial on the charge of Forgery, a Second Degree Felony. In so concluding the Court made the 
following specific: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The alleged forgery is a document which was received as State's Exhibit No. 
1, said document purporting to be a receipt signed by one Leslie Church purporting to 
acknowledge the payment of the sum of $227.79. 
2. The Court finds that there is probable cause to believe that the Defendant 
made and executed the receipt for the purpose of concealing the theft of cash and/or value from 
Radio Shack. 
3. The Court specifically finds that the alleged forgery does not represent a 
"security, revenue stamp, or other instrument or writing issued by a government, or agency 
thereof as set forth in U.C.A. 76-6-501(3)(a). 
4. The court further specifically finds that the alleged forgery does not represent 
"a check with the face amount of $100 or more, an issue of stock, bond, or other instrument 
or writing purporting to represent an interest in or claim against any property" as those terms 
are defined in U.C.A. 76-6-501(3)(b). 
5. However, the Court finds that the alleged forgery does purport to represent 
"a pecuniary interest in or claim against any . . . enterprise": to wit: Coifs Plumbing, dba 
Radio Shack. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court make the following: 
2 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The alleged forgery purports to represent "a pecuniary interest in or claim 
against [an] enterprise" and therefore constitutes a second degree felony. 
2. There is probable cause to believe that the Defendant made and/or executed 
said document with a purpose to defraud another, to-wit for the purpose of concealing 
shortages in the Radio Shack till which would have otherwisejbfien^apparent. 
3 
ADDENDUM B 
ID 
11 
1 Court to do two things: I — in the context of the way 
2 proceedings are now handled in this district, this was the 
3 Court that handled the preliminary hearing, and I would ask 
4 the Court to first of all, if the Court finds the findings 
5 and conclusions that I have prepared for the Court's 
6
 execution in connection with the bindover order as being 
7 findings of fact that the Court did make and conclusions of 
B
 law that the Court did reach in connection with that 
9 I decision, to bind my client over to the District Court for 
trial. And I would ask the Court to execute those findings 
and conclusions and make them a part of this record. 
1 2
 I would also ask the Court, since this Court was the 
13
 committing magistrate and since the proceedings are — the 
14
 preliminary hearing proceedings were in the same court, I 
15
 would ask the Court to take judicial notice of those 
16
 proceedings in ruling on the motion to quash. And the 
17
 I reason I ask the Court to do that is that in the event where 
there is an appeal taken and in the event that we feel some 
need to supplement that record on appeal, I would like the 
2 0
 ability or the availability of the preliminary hearing 
21
 proceedings on the appeal to the extent that there's some 
2 2
 issue that maybe is not addressed in the findings and 
2 3
 conclusions, but is pivotal to the decision on appeal. 
2 4
 THE COURT: Because the only evidence before the 
2 5
 Court in the form of the sworn testimony is the preliminary 
18 
19 
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN. JR. 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER 
< * 0 1 ) « 7 3 - S 1 0 0 
hearing transcript? 
MR. PENDLETON: That's right. 
THE COURT: All right, Mr. Langston, I don't see a 
problem in following that course. Do you have any 
difficulty with that? 
MR. LANGSTON: No, I don't have any problem with 
that. 
THE COURT: Let me quickly review the findings and 
conclusions regarding gradation of offense. 
I think those findings specifically outline my findings 
at the preliminary hearing, so I will execute findings of 
fact and conclusions of law with respect to the findings at 
the preliminary hearing. 
Now, with respect with your motion to quash, Mr. 
Pendleton, the Court specifically takes judicial notice of 
the preliminary hearing as the District Judge in the Fifth 
District. I sat as the committing magistrate in this 
matter. I have a clear recollection of the testimony 
offered by the State of Utah at the preliminary hearing in 
this matter, and based upon that testimony at the 
preliminary hearing, which is the evidentiary basis for the 
Court's decision on the motion to quash, the Court having 
specifically found its findings of fact with respect to that 
issue, I again reiterate in respect to the motion to quash 
that the forgery, which is the subject of this matter and 
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN. JR. 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER C 
the prior focus at the preliminary hearing, the purported 
receipt alleged to have been signed by one Leslie Church/ 
acknowledging the payment of $227.79 was not a security, 
revenue, stamp or other instrument in writing issued by the 
government or agency thereof. It was not a check with a 
face amount of $100 or more, an issue of stock, bond or 
other instrument or writing purporting to represent an 
interest or claim against any property. I do# however, find 
that that particular receipt allegedly signed Leslie Church 
was a document which represented a pecuniary interest in or 
claim against the enterprising question here, which happened 
to be the St. George Radio Shack, which is a dba for Coif's 
Plumbing. 
And with that finding, your motion to quash is denied 
based specifically upon the testimony at the preliminary 
hearing. 
I think that concludes your record adequately, counsel? 
MR. PENDLETON: It does with one — does the Court 
have my statement of points and authorities in the file? 
THE COURT: Your statement of points and 
authorities is here in the file (inaudible, microphone not 
working.) 
MR. PENDLETON: Okay. I think that makes my 
record. 
It is our intent to enter into an agreement with the 
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN, JR. 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER ( • O X ) « 7 » - » I O O ^ 
ADDENDUM C 
3c3:o /ftaeK FRANCHISE/DEALER STORE 
STORE OWNED AND OPERATED BY 
COLFS PT.UMBTNG TNC R/S 1H.R . 
781 SOUTH BT.UFF STREET 
ST GEORGE UT 84770 
PHONE 801-628-4241 
*** NO CASH REFUNDS AFTER 5 DAYS *** 
/ INVOICE NO. \ 
SOLD TO 
f?:STOMFR # 3320 
i. MASCTANTONTO 
210 N. 100 E. 
WASHINGTON UTAH 84780 
DES(*t^N"SirrTTT--q r 1 D»H P R i^ :0 f t 
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22-
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All merchandise returned for credit, refund or exchange must be in new and re-saleable 
condition in original cartons with original packing, accessories, guarantees and instructions, 
and must be accompanied by this sales slip Non-Radio Shack merchandise for exchange 
or refund can only be returned to this store The above store is an independently owned 
dealer/franchise. Policies regarding refunds and exchanges are determined by the owner. 
Radio Shack warranties are limited to the written limited warranty which accompanies 
merchandise manufactured by or for the Radio Shack Division of Tandy Corporation 
SUBTOTAL 
TAX 2 5 4 . 9 2 
TOTA * " 
• 
CASH D F P O S T : 
i^T.ANCE DUE 
SALES OF COMPUTER EQUIPMENT AND SOFTWARE " 
\^ 2 7 0 . 2 2 J 
7 0 . 0 0 
21,0 . 2 2 
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STORE COPY 
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 . » '.av 
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STORE NO 
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^ • • 0 li 
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: "MFV 
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v or 
2 0 0 , 2 2 
- 0 .00 
Al l merchandise returned for creo)t, refundor exchange mutt be in new and resaleable 
condition »n original cartons with original packing accessories, guarantees and instructions. 
»r\d must be accompanied by this sales slip Non Radio Shack merchandise for exchange 
-or refund can only be returned to this store The above store is an independently owned 
dealer/franchise Policies regarding refunds and exchanges ere determined by the owner. 
Radio Shack warranties are limited to the written limited warranty which accompanies 
merchandise manufactured by or for the Radio Shack Division of Tfcndy Corporation 
SUB TOTAL 
TAX 
TOTAL 
• SALES OF COMPUTER EQUIPMENT ANO SOFTWARE LICENSEO ARE SUSJECT TO TERMS AND CONDITIONS IDENTIFIED ON SACK STORE COPY 
Radio /hack FRANCHISE/DEALER STORE 
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AH merchandise returnecNoy credit, refund or exchange must be in new and re-saleable 
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or refund can only be returned to this jtore The above store is an independently owned 
dealer/franchise Policies regarding refunds vri exchanges are determined by the owner 
Radio Shack warranties are lirjnited to the written limited warranty which accompanies 
merchandise manufacture^ bvor<4or the RadioJShack Division of Tandy Corporation 
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